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ARTICLES
ALL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ARE NOT
CREATED EQUAL: NEW HOPE IN THE
POLITICAL SPEECH WARS
James Bopp, Jr.*
It is an unfortunate reality in today's election law world that those with
a passion to participate fully in the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open"'
marketplace of political speech often must have the fortitude to pass first
through the federal courthouse to vindicate their constitutional rights to
do so. Since the early 1970s, an increasingly complicated web of federal
and state statutes, administrative regulations, and agency advisory opin-
ions have converted "the freedom of speech"2 guarantee by the Bill of
Rights into a trap for the unwary by making potential criminals out of
those who pursue once innocent endeavors like paying for an ad in the
local newspaper,3 or on the local radio,4 or television station
To justify this proliferation of government regulation of pure political
speech and association, the campaign finance "reformers" decry the in-
fluence of "Special Interests" backed by "Big Money" without any ap-
parent embarrassment that the "reform" crowd is an especially vocal
* James Bopp, Jr., B.A., Indiana University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida, 1973; Attor-
ney, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana; Of Counsel, Webster, Chamberlain
& Bean, Washington, D.C.; General Counsel, James Madison Center for Free Speech;
Chairman, Election Law Subcommittee, Free Speech and Election Law Practice Group of
the Federalist Society.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to attorney James R. Mason, III, Bopp,
Coleson & Bostrom for research and writing assistance.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the First
Amendment embodies "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.... Id.
3. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 1987).
4. See Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d 928, 938 (1999) (plaintiffs rep-
resented by author).
5. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 952
n.6, 953 (W.D. Va. 1995), affd mem., 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
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coalition of special interests backed by big money.6 Leaving aside discus-
sion of the reformers' motivations, the result of many so-called "reform"
efforts is to limit the amount of money that individuals and organizations
may donate to others to pay for the publication or broadcasting of politi-
cal speech. The Supreme Court has upheld limits on the size of individ-
ual and political committee contributions to a candidate's campaign war
chest to prevent the evil of quid pro quo corruption of a candidate cre-
ated by large contributions.7 As more states pass ever-lower limits on
contributions to candidates, court battles rage over how low a limit can
be before it is unconstitutionally too low.
8
Not all political contributions, even large ones, however, necessarily
implicate the governmental interest in preventing corruption of a candi-
date. Nevertheless, the federal government and many states limit the
size of those political contributions, apparently based on the mistaken
belief that contributions are less deserving of constitutional protection
than are expenditures.9
This Article will discuss two relatively new battlegrounds in the speech
wars where federal and state limits on contributions are ripe for a court
to strike the limits down, regardless of size. First, a compelling govern-
6. For example, billionaire Jerome Kohlberg is the principal donor for The Cam-
paign for America Project, a self-styled "reform" organization. The Project spent over
$300,000 in 1998 on advertisements promoting campaign finance reform and over $466,000
on advertisements attempting to defeat now-Senator Jim Bunning in the Kentucky federal
senatorial election because Bunning did not agree with its position. The Project did much
of this spending after extensive consultations with other "reform" groups, including Com-
mon Cause, League of Women Voters, Public Citizen, PIRG, and Public Campaign. See
Affidavit of Douglas Berman, President of Campaign for America, March 25, 1999, in
support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, C.A. No. 98-CV-1207 (WBB) (D.D.C. 1998). Additionally, Public
Campaign accepted $1 million from former Democratic Rep. Cecil Heftel and $3 million
from the Open Society Institute, whose founder, billionaire George Soros made his for-
tune speculating in the post-communist European currency markets. Public Citizen re-
fuses to disclose the source of its money. See Chuck Raasch, Do Public Interest Groups
that Push Campaign Finance Reform Really Represent Citizens?, GANNET NEWS SERVICE,
June 13, 1997.
7. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam).
8. This Article will not address the problem of limits on contributions to candidates
that are unconstitutionally too low. For a thorough discussion of that issue, see generally
James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U.
L. REV. 235 (1998-99) and D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurdle for
Campaign Finance "Reform," 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1998).
9. There is a split in the circuits over whether contribution limits are to be evaluated
under "strict" scrutiny, see Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 1998); Kruse v.
City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911-12.(6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 511 (1998),
or "rigorous" scrutiny, see Vaumatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (Bru-
netti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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mental interest does not justify federal and state limits on individual con-
tributions to political committees organized for the sole purpose of
making independent expenditures. Second, federal and state limits on
individual contributions to political parties designated to be spent on the
party's own speech, whether independently or in coordination with a
candidate, are unconstitutional because political parties do not corrupt
their own candidates. For this same reason, limits on intra-party trans-
fers cannot be justified. This Article will also discuss an emerging trend
in courts holding that governments may not ban direct monetary contri-
butions to candidates made by certain not-for-profit ideological corpora-
tions.
Contribution limits are not created equal. If not justified by the com-
pelling governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption,
contribution limits must fail. By reorganizing their handling of contribu-
tions and by mounting preenforcement challenges to unjustified contri-
bution limits, organizations and political parties can position themselves
so that they and their individual contributors may be free to participate
in the political process to a greater degree than federal and many state
laws permit today. That is, that organizations and political parties may
be able to participate to the full extent guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.
This Article proceeds from the premise that the First Amendment is
not a loophole' ° employed by the unscrupulous to evade the legitimate
ends of a paternalistic state." Rather, the First Amendment is the su-
preme election law of the land, and stands as the preeminent safeguard
of our republican democracy. Furthermore, the First Amendment is the
reef on which overreaching government regulations of speech run
aground and eventually founder, to the benefit of a liberty-loving people.
Thankfully, in the last decade, courts have struck down dozens of re-
cently enacted government restrictions of political speech as violating the
First Amendment." For those who still believe that "We the people" are
10. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment is Not a Loop-
hole: Protecting Free Expression in the Election Campaign Context, 28 U. WEST L.A. L.
REV. 1 (1997).
11. See Wanda Franz & James Bopp, Jr., The Nine Myths of Campaign Finance Re-
form, 10:1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63,64 (1998).
12. The author has been privileged to represent numerous plaintiffs in their success-
ful efforts to vindicate their constitutional right to free speech in the election context. See
Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999); North Carolina
Right To Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 718 (4th Cir. 1999); California Prolife Council
Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 164 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999); Clifton v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1317 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998)
(mem.); Minnesota Concerned Citizens for Life v. Federal Election Comm'n, 113 F.3d
1999]
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sovereign and that "the freedom of speech" stands as a bulwark against
government tyranny, be of good cheer. The more the "reformers"
tighten their grip, the more political speech slips through their fingers!
I. BACKGROUND
In the field of First Amendment election law, all roads eventually
lead to the Supreme Court's landmark opinion, Buckley v. Valeo, 3 where
the Court addressed several aspects of Congress' comprehensive, post-
Watergate regulation of campaign finances, the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA).14 Out of Buckley emerged the critical constitutional
distinctions between a candidate spending money on her own speech
(expenditures), which government could not constitutionally limit, and
money given by individuals to a candidate (contributions), which could
be subject to some limits to prevent quid pro quo corruption.
Buckley also made important distinctions about money spent by a non-
candidate on speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
candidate. It is beyond Congress' power to limit the amount of money
spent by an individual independently from the candidate (independent
expenditure). When the individual, however, coordinates the content,
timing, and distribution of the express advocacy speech with the candi-
date (coordinated expenditure), the money spent by the individual may
be treated like a direct monetary contribution to the candidate and lim-
ited accordingly." The Buckley opinion did not address the FECA's
limitations on contributions to political action committees (PACs), or its
limitations on individual contributions to political parties or from parties
to candidates in the form of coordinated expenditures. But it established
the analytical framework for judging whether those limits are constitu-
tional.
II. INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE PACS
Many states and the federal government impose limits on the amount
129, 133 (8th Cir. 1997); New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner,
99 F.3d 8, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1996); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994);
Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991); Maine Right to
Life Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd per cu-
riam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997) (mem.).
13. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
14. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21.
16. See id. at 25-27.
17. See id. at 46 & n.53.
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of money an individual may contribute to a PAC.18 Definitions of what it
takes to be considered a PAC vary widely in the specifics, but they tend
to share the same general features. The FECA's definition is representa-
tive: "The term 'political committee' means ... any committee, club, as-
sociation, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggre-
gating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year ....,,19
A political committee is nothing more than an association of persons
who pool their resources and spend them to advance their commonly
held political beliefs through the electoral process. Generally, political
committees use their money either to make direct monetary contribu-
tions to candidates-who then use the money as they see fit, or to pay for
18. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.070 (Michie 1998)
(imposing a limit of $500 per year); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-905(E) (West Supp.
1998) (limiting aggregate contribution to $2820 per annum); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-
203(b) (Michie 1993) (limiting aggregate contribution to $1000 per election); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-333m(d) (West Supp. 1999) (restricting aggregate contributions to $15,000
per election); D.C. CODE ANN § 1-1441.1(d)(1) (1999) (imposing $5000 limit per election);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999) (restricting contributions to $500 per
election); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-204(b) (Michie 1998) (limiting contributions to
$1000 per election); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.150(10) (Michie Supp. 1998) (imposing a
$1500 per year restriction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1505.2(K)(1) (West Supp. 1999) (re-
stricting contributions to $100,000 per every four year election cycle); MD. CODE ANN.,
ELEC. § 26-9(d)(1) (1997) (restricting contributions to $4000 per four year election cycle);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 7A(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999) (restricting contributions to
$500 per year); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4(V)(1) (1996) (restricting contributions to
$5000 or $1000 if candidate does not abide by voluntary spending limits); N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 14-114(8) (McKinney 1998) (limiting aggregate contributions to $150,000 per year); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13(a) (1995) (imposing a $4000 contribution limit per election);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10.2(B)(1)(g) (Anderson 1998) (restricting contributions
to $5000 per year); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 187.1(A)(1) (West Supp. 1999) (restricting
contributions to $5000 per person or family per year); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-10.1(a)(1)
(1996) (limiting contributions to $1000 per year); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-1314(A)(1)(a),
8-13-1322(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (restricting contributions to $3500 per year); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (Supp. 1998) (restricting contributions to $2000 per year per
two year election cycle); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(f) (1999) (limiting contributions to $1000
per election); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.26(4) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting aggregate contribu-
tions to $10,000 per year); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102(c) (Michie 1999) (imposing a
$25,000 contribution restriction per election cycle).
19. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994). The State of Vermont's definition is typical of state
PAC definitions and is similar in character to the FECA's: "'Political committee' ...
means any formal or informal committee of two or more individuals, not including a po-
litical party, which receives contributions or makes expenditures of more than $500.00 in
any one calendar year for the purpose of supporting or opposing one or more candidates .. "
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(4). For purposes of the First Amendment, a permissible
definition of "political committee" is further limited to "organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a
candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79, quoted in Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 n.6 (1986).
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the political committee's own speech. The FECA limits the amount an
individual may contribute to a federal PAC to $5000 per calendar year.20
The FECA definition of political committee, like most state statutes,
imposes limits on contributions to PACs without recognizing a distinc-
tion between a PAC that makes contributions and one that makes only
independent expenditures. One, however, cannot use government labels
to justify restrictions on political speech or association.2 Thus, although
a particular statutory scheme does not specifically provide for the organi-
zation of independent expenditure PACs (IE-PACs), the government
cannot prevent individuals from associating for that purpose, or from ex-
ercising their First Amendment freedoms to the constitutional limit.
A. Contribution Limits and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has generally upheld the concept of contribution
limits, but it has uniformly struck down all attempts by Congress and the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to impose limits on independent• 22
expenditures. Even though the First Amendment protects contribu-
tions as association and speech, courts have upheld contribution limits
when the particular limits were narrowly tailored to address a compelling
governmental interest.23 The Supreme Court's rationale for the distinc-
tion between contributions and independent expenditures has been that
a large monetary contribution to a candidate presents the risk of quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance, while independent expenditures do
not. In the words of the Buckley Court:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well
provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement
and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
24candidate.
The Supreme Court's requirement that contribution limits must be
20. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1994).
21. See Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 621-22 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) ("An agency's simply calling an in-
dependent expenditure a 'coordinated expenditure' cannot (for constitutional purposes)
make it one.").
22. Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled that even political parties could make
unlimited independent expenditures. See Colorado Republican, 58 U.S. at 613-15.
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
24. Id. at 47.
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aimed at the prevention of quid pro quo corruption of a candidate, when
considered in conjunction with its well-established precedent that unlim-
ited independent expenditures do not present that risk, logically requires
the conclusion that imposing limits on the ability of individuals to pool
their money for the sole purpose of making independent expenditures by
giving money to an "Independent Expenditure PAC," would not be justi-
fied by the compelling governmental interest of preventing quid pro quo
corruption of a candidate.
Consider the following: the government has no compelling interest in
preventing Smith from spending more than $5000 to advocate the elec-
tion of a candidate. It also has no compelling interest in preventing
Jones from doing likewise. Additionally, if Smith and Jones were to as-
sociate by pooling their resources, the government would also have no
compelling interest in limiting the Smith-Jones IE-PAC's independent
expenditures.25 How, then, can the government justify limiting Smith and
Jones to contributing only $5000 apiece to the Smith-Jones IE-PAC26
when neither their individual spending nor their combined spending im-
plicate a compelling governmental interest?
Although no case has ever directly addressed the issue," in California
Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court
strongly supported the above analysis. 8 That case involved an FEC en-
forcement action against California Medical Association for accepting
contributions to its own PAC in excess of the $5000 contribution limit.29
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Marshall, four members of the
25. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985).
26. The FECA does not make a statutory distinction between "contribution PACs"
and "IE-PACs." The Court's reasoning suggests a distinction between what government
regulation the First Amendment permits and what it does not. The FEC, however, has
recognized the implications of California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453
U.S. 182 (1981), and attempted to foreclose the formation of IE-PACs by administrative
regulation. "[Tihe limitation on contributions of this paragraph also applies to contribu-
tions made to political committees making independent expenditures . 11 C.F.R.
110.1(d)(2) (1999).
27. On September 9, 1999, the District Court for the Northern District of California
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of a contribution limit as applied to an IE-PAC. See
San Franciscans For Sensible Gov't. v. Renne, No. C 99-02456 CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
1999) (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction). The Ninth Circuit
stayed the injunction pending appeal, see Campaign Cash Restricted in S.F., S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 6, 1999, but lifted the stay on October 21, 1999, see San Franciscans for Sensible Gov-
ernment v. Renne, No. 99-16995 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (on file with the Catholic Univer-
sity Law Review).
28. 453 U.S. at 197-98.
29. See id. at 186.
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Catholic University Law Review
Court voted to uphold the individual $5000 limit to multicandidate
PACs, in part, because multicandidate PACs by definition make direct
monetary contributions to five or more federal candidates'" Although
some of the reasoning in the plurality opinion is problematic,31 the plu-
rality specifically left open the question of the constitutionality of the
$5000 contribution limit as applied to IE-PACs
More importantly, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion makes it
clear that his deciding vote depended on limiting the holding in the case
to multicandidate PACs, which make contributions to candidates, and
would not reach IE-PACs, which, as he explained, could not make con-
tributions to candidates. Without Justice Blackmun's concurrence in the
judgment, the $5000 contribution limit to multicandidate PACs would
not have been upheld. Accordingly, in a future case, Justice Blackmun's
forceful reasoning in defense of the constitutional right of individuals to
make unlimited contributions to IE-PACs (and the right of IE-PACs to
accept them) would be afforded great weight.
Justice Blackmun's discussion begins with a correct understanding of
the underlying rationale for the Court's distinction between contribu-
tions and independent expenditures first expressed in Buckley:
Buckley states that "contribution and expenditure limitations
both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests," and
that "governmental 'action which may have the effect of cur-
tailing freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."'
Thus, contribution limitations can be upheld only "if the State
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of asso-
ciational freedoms. ,
33
With the above understanding in mind, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the contribution limits to multicandidate PACs passed the test "as a
means of preventing evasion of the limitations on contributions to a can-
didate or his authorized campaign committee upheld in Buckley."
' '
Turning to the question of IE-PACs, Justice Blackmun continued:
I stress, however, that . . . a different result would follow if
§ 441a(a)(1)(C) were applied to contributions to a political
30. See id. at 196, 201. Multicandidate PAC is defined in 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4)
(1994).
31. See California Medical, 453 U.S. at 196-97 (discussing in dicta the FEC's "speech
by proxy" argument).
32. See id. at 197 n.17.
33. Id. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976)) (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
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committee established for the purpose of making independent
expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates .... The
Court repeatedly has recognized that effective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association. By pooling
their resources, adherents of an association amplify their own
voices; the association is but the medium through which its in-
dividual members seek to make more effective the expression
of their own views. Accordingly, I believe that contributions to
political committees can be limited only if those contributions
implicate the governmental interest in preventing actual or po-
tential corruption, and if the limitation is no broader than nec-
essary to achieve that interest.
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Ac-
36tion Committee, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that limits on independ-
ent expenditures by political committees were unconstitutional, and rec-
ognized unequivocally that California Medical applied only to
multicandidate PACs:
The FEC urges that these contributions do not constitute indi-
vidual speech, but merely "speech by proxy,".... The plurality
emphasized in that case, however, that nothing in the statutory
provision in question "limits the amount [an unincorporated as-
sociation] ... may independently expend in order to advocate
political views," but only the amount it may contribute to a mul-
ticandidate political committee. "
B. Challenging PAC Contribution Limits as Applied to IE-PACs
The FECA's definition of political committee (and most state statutory
definitions) does not recognize a separate category for IE-PACs. An IE-
PAC can accept unlimited contributions from individuals and make un-
limited independent expenditures to expressly advocate the election or
defeat of federal candidates, including candidates for President. Addi-
tionally, the courts have never decided the constitutionality of FECA's
PAC contribution limits as applied to IE-PACs. If an organization were
to find it useful to establish an IE-PAC, it would be necessary to sue the
FEC in a preenforcement challenge against § 441a(a)(1)(C) of the FECA
as applied to IE-PACs, and against the FEC regulation that implements
35. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
36. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
37. Id. at 494-95 (citing California Medical, 453 U.S. at 196 (Marshall, J.) (plurality
opinion)) (emphasis added).
1999]
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the statute.38
Recent cases in the Eighth Circuit suggest that such a challenge would
be successful. In Day v. Holahan,39 the court struck down a state's con-
tribution limit to PACs, including those that make contributions, stating
that "the concern of a political quid pro quo for large contributions,
which becomes a possibility when the contribution is to an individual
candidate is not present when the contribution is given to a political
committee or fund that by itself does not have legislative power."
'
40
The Eighth Circuit reiterated its belief that contributions to political
committees do not present a risk of corruption of a candidate in Russell
v. Burris,41 where the court again struck down a state's contribution limit
to PACs, reasoning that "[t]here is also less of a danger of quid pro quo
corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contribu-
tions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC
that does not itself wield legislative power., 42 The Eighth Circuit cases
have evaluated PAC contribution limits strictly in terms of the govern-
mental interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption of a candidate.
These cases do not advert to, much less follow, the prophylactic rationale
of the plurality opinion in California Medical that limits to PACs are
necessary to prevent corruption of candidates.
The salutary result of a successful challenge to PAC contribution limits
by an IE-PAC would be to increase the liberty of individuals to associate
to amplify their voices by producing more and better political speech.
That, in turn, would provide voters with more information about candi-
dates from sources other than the candidate's campaign and the news
38. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(d)(2) (1999) ("The limitation on contributions of this para-
graph also applies to contributions made to political committees making independent ex-
penditures .... "). Additionally, an individual donor plaintiff would also need to challenge
the $25,000 aggregate maximum contribution limit in § 441a(a)(3). While it is true that
Buckley upheld the $25,000 limit, the Court was not presented with an as-applied chal-
lenge by an IE-PAC. Further, § 110.1(h)(2) would prohibit an individual from contribut-
ing to an IE-PAC "with the knowledge that a substantial portion will be ... expended on
behalf of" a federal candidate to whom the individual also made a contribution. 11 C.F.R.
§ 110.1(h)(2) (1999). The FEC has interpreted this provision in an advisory opinion to be
an outright ban on contributing to a "single candidate committee that makes independent
expenditures on behalf of the candidate" if the contributor has already made a $1000 con-
tribution to the candidate. Limitations on Contributions to Unauthorized Comm., 17,016
Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 6914 (Jan. 26, 1989) (Answer to Charles H.
Breecher, Del. Volunteers for Reagan). Accordingly, the individual plaintiff would need
to challenge this regulation as well.
39. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 1365 (citation omitted).
41. 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 571.
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media. This result, while antithetical to the goals behind many efforts at
so-called "reform," is the constitutional norm:
The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaf-
firm their own positions on issues in response to political mes-
sages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption, for
one of the essential features of democracy is the presentation to
the electorate of varying points of view.43
III. CHALLENGING INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS TO POLITICAL
PARTIES
Political parties could also benefit by creating an internal independent
expenditure account, which, analytically at least, ought to be allowed to
receive unlimited contributions from individuals for the same reasons
that an IE-PAC would be able to receive such contributions. Political
parties, however, are not just "super-PACS," suggesting that the First
Amendment analysis regarding the relationship between individual con-
tributors, a political party, and a party's candidates requires a more nu-
anced approach. The developing case law indicates that a party's expen-
diture for its own speech may not be limited constitutionally whether it is
done independently or in coordination with the candidate because par-
ties are not a source of candidate corruption. The only adequate justifi-
cation for government limits on funding political speech is preventing
corruption." This, in turn, implies that individual contributions to a po-
litical party, which the party would use to pay for the party's own speech
(whether independent or coordinated), likewise may not be limited con-
stitutionally.
A. Political Parties are Unique Institutions and Ought to be Encouraged
Haley Barbour, the former Chairman of the Republican National
Committee, defined a political party as "an association of like-minded
people who debate issues, who attempt to influence government policy,
and who work together to elect like-minded people to local, State, and
Federal office., 45 Mr. Barbour's definition succinctly raises the constitu-
43. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 498 (1985).
44. See id. at 496-97 ("We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent
Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign fi-
nances.").
45. Campaign Finance Reform Legislation: The Role of Political Parties: Hearing Be-
fore the House Comm. on House Oversight, 104th Cong. 10-11 (1995) [hereinafter Cam-
paign Finance Reform Hearing] (statement of Haley S. Barbour, former chairman, Re-
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tionally protected First Amendment activities in which political parties
engage. First, political parties have a legitimate role in debating issues,
promoting ideas, and in formulating public policy. Second, parties are
primarily an association of people; they are not simply repositories for
campaign contributions, or super-PAC's. Third, national parties have
significant local and state components; they are national, not federal,
committees. National parties exist for the purpose of electing federal
and state candidates and for effecting federal and state public policy.
Although there are varying opinions about the role of money in cam-
paigns, there is almost universal agreement that political parties ought to
be strengthened rather than weakened. For example, A. James Reichley,
Visiting Senior Fellow of the Graduate Public Policy Program at George-
town University, testified before the House Oversight Committee on the
Role of Political Parties that "there is a broad consensus within the pro-
fession [of political scientists] on the desirability of strengthening parties,
that parties have been weakened in the overall system."46 Parties ought
to be strengthened because they "promote agreement between different
interests and groups," promote discussion of major issues, and educate
the electorate.47 They also "foster effective government" across all divi-
sions of the American system by "providing responsibility and account-
ability., 48 Additionally, they "promote participation," and perhaps, most
relevant, parties "promote clean politics."
49
Contrary to the widely-held belief regarding the desirability of
strengthening parties, many efforts at reform, including the FECA, have
had the opposite effect. As Congressman William Thomas, Chairman of
the House Committee on Oversight has explained:
[P]olitical parties are unique institutions. Unfortunately, I don't
believe there was adequate knowledge in the 1970s about the
role of the political parties in not only recruiting candidates but
getting them elected and then programming public policy and
the issues, or the education that the parties do. Perhaps, the
limits that were placed on the ability of political parties to get
funds I think significantly hampered parties in a negative way
and relatively enhanced the special interests. Now, while peo-
ple are looking at ways to change the system, I think perhaps
publican National Committee).
46. Id. at 66 (statement of A. James Reichley, visiting Senior Fellow of the Graduate
Public Policy Program, Georgetown University).
47. Id. at 42 (statement of Gerald M. Pomper, Professor of Political Science, Engle-
ton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University).
48. Id. at 42-43.
49. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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unleashing political parties or freeing them from the current
legislation would go a long way toward solving our problems.0
Nevertheless, the trend in recently adopted state legislation" and pro-
posed federal legislation52 is to continue to restrict further the legitimate
role of political parties by imposing new limits on political party funding.
As the legislative noose tightens, the Supreme Court has begun to im-
pose judicial limits on government's ability to restrict political party
speech through restrictions on party funding.
B. Colorado Republicans Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission
In what has the potential to be one of the most staggering examples of
unintended consequences for the "reformers," the FEC commenced an
enforcement action against the Colorado Republican Party for exceeding
the FECA's limits on party expenditures53 when it paid for certain politi-
cal advertisements before the 1986 federal election.4 In Round I, seven
justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the FECA's party expenditure
limits could not be applied constitutionally to party independent expen-
ditures: "We do not see how a Constitution that grants to individuals,
candidates, and ordinary political committees the right to make unlim-
ited independent expenditures could deny the same right to political par-
ties."
The Court specifically left open, however, the question of whether the
FECA's limitations on party expenditures is constitutional as applied to
party express advocacy expenditures coordinated with the candidate. 6 In
other contexts, the Court has treated coordinated expenditures as candi-
date contributions. But, as applied to political parties, the Court ex-
50. Id. at 27-28 (statement of Congressman William Thomas, Chairman, House
Committee on Oversight).
51. For example, Vermont recently enacted a $2000 contribution limit to the state
political party, which includes transfers from the national party committee. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (Supp. 1998).
52. See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417, 106th Cong.
§ 101 (1999); BiPartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 26, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
"A national committee of a political party ... shall not solicit, receive, or direct to another
person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds, or spend any funds, that are not
subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirement of this Act." H.R. 417,
106th Cong. § 101 (1999).
53. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1994).
54. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n.,
518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
55. Id. at 618.
56. See id. at 622, 625-26.
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pressed skepticism about whether Congress enacted the provision for a
valid governmental purpose: "[T]his Court's opinions suggest that Con-
gress wrote the Party Expenditure Provision not so much because of a
special concern about the potentially 'corrupting' effect of party expendi-
tures, but rather for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing
what it saw as wasteful.., spending." 7
Four concurring Justices would have reached the question of the facial
constitutionality of the party spending limits. Those Justices would have
held that limits on the amount of money that a political party may spend
on both independent and coordinated express advocacy communications
are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. As Justice Kennedy
said in his concurrence, which the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joined:
The problem is not just the absence of a basis in our First
Amendment cases for treating the party's spending as contribu-
tions. The greater difficulty posed by the statute is its stifling ef-
fect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do. It is
fanciful to suppose that limiting party spending of the type at is-
sue here does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom
to discuss candidates and issues, since it would be impractical
and imprudent, to say the least, for a party to support its own
candidates without some form of "cooperation" or "consulta-
tion." The party's speech, legitimate in its own behalf, cannot
be separated from speech on the candidate's behalf without
constraining the party in advocating its most essential positions
and pursuing its most basic goals. The party's form of organiza-
tion and the fact that its fate in an election is inextricably inter-
twined with that of its candidates cannot provide a basis for the
[expenditure] restrictions imposed here."
As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurring opinion, in which the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joined:
The structure of political parties is such that the theoretical
danger of those groups actually engaging in quid pro quos with
candidates is significantly less than the threat of individuals or
other groups doing so. American political parties, generally
speaking, have numerous members with a wide variety of inter-
ests, features necessary for success in majoritarian elections.
Consequently, the influence of any one person or the impor-
tance of any single issue within a political party is significantly
57. Id. at 618.
58. Id. at 630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (inter-
nal quotations & citations omitted).
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diffused. 9
On remand, the district court agreed with the concurring justices and
held that the FEC had failed to meet its burden of proving that limits on
party coordinated expenditures are justified by a compelling governmen-
tal interesti ° The district court rejected all of the FEC's proffered justifi-
cations as either illogical, in view of the unique role that parties play in
the political process, or as unsupported by the evidence." The FEC has
appealed from that decision, setting the stage for Round II of the Colo-
rado Republican case-the Supreme Court possibly striking down limits
on coordinated party expenditures.
If that is the outcome of Round II, it would seriously call into question
the justification for limiting the amount an individual could contribute to
a political party. As the courts continue to grapple with restrictions on
political parties, the emerging picture is not of an institution that is in-
herently corrupting of candidates. Rather, courts appear to view political
parties as healthy, moderating influences on the electoral process."
No one has challenged the FECA's $20,000 individual contribution
limit to political parties.63 If a party's unlimited spending to produce
speech in coordination with a candidate does not raise, however, the
specter of quid pro quo corruption of the candidate, then it logically fol-
lows that an individual's contribution to the party would not be a source
of quid pro quo corruption either. As one prominent proponent of cam-
paign finance reform has conceded: "For political parties, there seems
little alternative to simply legitimizing what has already happened de
facto: the abolition of all limits .... [Sluch an outcome is not to be la-
mented. Political parties deserve more fundraising freedom, which would
59. Id. at 646-647 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (ci-
tations omitted).
60. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41
F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1213 (D. Colo. 1999).
61. See id. at 1209-13. It is beyond the scope of this Article to refute the watered-
down definitions of "corruption" used by enforcers and reformers alike to justify unconsti-
tutional regulations of political speech. This Article adheres to the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of corruption of a candidate: "Corruption is a subversion of the political process.
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect
of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns." Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,497 (1985).
62. See Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162, 1164 (E.D.
Mo. 1999) (enjoining preliminary enforcement of $10,750, $5250 and $2750 state limits on
political party contributions to candidates). The court enjoined the state limits on the
ground that the party would likely succeed on merits of its claim that the statute violated
its First Amendment rights, the party faced the threat of irreparable harm if injunction
was denied, and issuing the injunction was in the public interest. See id. at 1163-64.
63. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(B) (1994).
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give these critical institutions a more substantial role in elections." 64
C. Challenging State Law Restrictions on Transfers from National Party
Committees to State Party Committees
As previously discussed, national parties have considerable constitu-
tionally protected interests to participate in state and local elections. The
FECA does not restrict the amount of money that may be transferred be-
tween national and state party committees. 65 There appears to be, how-
ever, a disturbing trend in state law, toward restricting intra-party trans-
fers. For example, in 1998, Vermont went from no restrictions to a $2000
per two-year cycle limit and, in 1999, Connecticut completely banned the
transfer of non-federal funds to state parties.66 Several other states also
limit intra-party transfers.67 If the trend continues unchallenged, national
party committees will increasingly find themselves on the sidelines in
state elections, and state parties will be deprived of a significant source of
funding. It is doubtful that restricting contributions from a national party
committee to a state party committee can be justified because that limit
is one step farther removed from a compelling government interest.
That is, if the national party committee does not present the risk of cor-
rupting federal candidates, how can it corrupt state candidates by trans-
ferring money to the state party committee, which likewise is inherently
noncorrupting of state candidates? State law restrictions on intra-party
transfers ought to be challenged because they are not justified by the
prevention of quid pro quo corruption and therefore may not be limited,
consistent with the First Amendment.
64. LARRY J. SABATO AND GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS 334 (1996)
(referring specifically to "soft" money contributions).
65. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) (1994).
66. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-333s(b) (West Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 2805(a) (Supp. 1998). Furthermore, to the extent that state law intra-party contribu-
tion limits would impinge on the ability of the state parties to produce issue advocacy
communications, they would be unconstitutional no matter what the original source of the
money.
67. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1441.1 (d)(1) (1999) (restricting contributions to $5000
per election); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-204(c) (1998) (imposing a $50,000 restriction);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153(d) (1993) (restricting contributions to $25,000 per year); MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. § 26-9(e)(2) (1997) (restricting contributions to $6000 per four year
election cycle); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 6 (West Supp. 1999) (imposing a $5000
contribution limit per year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.4(a)(2) (West 1999) (restricting
contributions to $50,000 per year); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-10.1 (1996) (limiting contribu-
tions to $25,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1314(A)(1)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (re-
stricting contributions to $3500 per year); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.640(6) (West
Supp. 1999) (limiting contributions to $2500); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(f) (1999) (restricting
contributions to $1000 per election).
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IV. CHALLENGING THE BAN ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
CORPORATIONS AS APPLIED TO IDEOLOGICAL CORPORATIONS
Another contribution limit that is not created equal is the ban on po-
litical contributions by corporations imposed by the federal 68 and many
state governments.' 9 In this regard, it is probably more accurate to say
that not all corporations are created equal, because, according to an
emerging trend in the lower courts, a ban on corporate contributions may
not be applied constitutionally to certain ideological corporations, de-
pending on the corporation's characteristics.
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life°
(MCFL), the FEC commenced an enforcement action against MCFL, a
nonprofit, nonstock, corporation, alleging that the money spent by
MCFL to produce a newsletter was a banned corporate expenditure un-
der the FECA 71 because the newsletter expressly advocated the election
of federal candidates. Even though the Supreme Court agreed with the
FEC that the communication was express advocacy, and therefore, a
banned "expenditure" by a corporation, it ruled that the FECA provi-
sion banning corporations from making "expenditure[s] 'in connection
with' any federal election, 72 could not constitutionally be applied to a
not-for-profit "ideological" corporation.
The Court noted that regulation of corporate political spending had
been generally upheld
to restrict the influence of political war chests funneled through
the corporate form; to eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth
on federal elections; to curb the political influence of those who
exercise control over large aggregations of capital; and to regu-
late the substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the spe-
68. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994).
69. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074(f) (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 16-
919(A) (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-333o(a) (West 1999); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 56.15(1) (West Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.025, 121.035 (Michie
1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
169.254 (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15 (West Supp. 1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4(I) (1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-278.15 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3599.03 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4219 (West 1995); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3253 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-10.1(h); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 12-25-2 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132(a) (1994); TEX. ELEC.
CODE ANN. §§ 253.094, 253.104 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-8(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
11.38(1)(a)(1) (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102(a) (Michie 1999).
70. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
71. See id. at 241.
72. Id.
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cial advantages which go with the corporate form. 3
The Court reasoned, however, that "[r]egulation of corporate political
activity thus has reflected concern not about the use of the corporate
form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for
political purposes.,
74
In evaluating the not-for-profit ideological corporation in light of the
above considerations, the Court concluded that MCFL did not engage in
business activities, had no shareholders, and was not established or
funded by a business corporation or labor union.75 Further, the Court
held that the FECA's ban on independent expenditures from MCFL's
corporate treasury "infringe[d] protected speech without a compelling
justification for such infringement.,
76
In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett,77 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the MCFL rationale and concluded that a state
corporate ban on direct monetary contributions to a candidate could not
be applied to an ideological corporation. Additionally, the Alaska Su-
preme Court ruled that Alaska's recently enacted ban on corporate con-
tributions could not be applied constitutionally to MCFL-type ideologi-
cal corporations. The Court in MCFL dealt with only independent
expenditures in the context of the FECA. The First Amendment ration-
ale relied on by the courts discussed above, however, would invalidate
the federal ban on corporate contributions as applied to ideological cor-
porations because it is not justified by the risk of quid pro quo corruption
either.
73. Id. at 257 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
74. Id. at 259.
75. See id. at 264.
76. Id. at 263. Significantly, three courts of appeals have held that MCFL did not
create a rigid, three-part test for determining whether § 441b may constitutionally be ap-
plied to an ideological corporation. Rather, the characteristics of MCFL are illustrative of
considerations to be made in determining whether the ideological corporation represents a
threat of corrupting the political process because of wealth unrelated to its advocacy of
political ideas. See North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th
Cir. 1999) (striking down a state statutory exemption for MCFL-type corporations as too
narrow); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1363-65 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Survival Educ.
Fund v. Federal Election Comm'n, 65 F.3d 285, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting MCFL-
type corporation summary judgment in FEC enforcement civil suit even though the non-
profit corporation accepted some contributions from business corporations). Further-
more, the Eighth Circuit struck down as facially unconstitutional a FEC regulation, 11
C.F.R. § 114.10, which essentially codified the precise features of MCFL. See Minnesota
Concerned Citizens for Life v. Federal Election Comm'n, 113 F.3d 129, 132-33 (8th Cir.
1997).
77. 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
78. See Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 611-13 (Alaska 1999).
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Although this logical extension of MCFL to include direct monetary
contributions does not have the far-reaching significance presented by
the possibility of unlimited constitutionally protected individual contri-
butions to IE-PACs or to political party committees, it does allow those
ideological corporations greater flexibility in directly participating in the
electoral process. Qualifying ideological corporations would need to be
mindful of the tax consequences of direct electoral intervention. Addi-
tionally, if a qualifying ideological corporation's independent expendi-
tures and contributions were to become the corporation's major purpose,
it would be required to comply with the additional organizational, re-
porting, and disclosure requirements required of a political committee
under federal and many state laws.79 Navigating these additional risks is
a small trade-off for even a modest increase in First Amendment liberty.
As the late Supreme Court Justice William Brennan eloquently summa-
rized in MCFL:
Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as
this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech is the ma-
trix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom. Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however,
may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would be
unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For this reason, we must be
as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are
against its sweeping restriction.8s
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed typical limits on political contributions that
are not justified by a compelling governmental interest. For this reason,
limits on individual contributions to independent expenditure PACs and
political parties are ripe for preenforcement challenges. Likewise, re-
cently enacted state limits on intra-party transfers will not withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny. Finally, the federal and state bans on the use of general
treasury funds for direct monetary contributions to candidates may not
be applied constitutionally to a qualified not-for-profit ideological corpo-
ration. When faced with these unconstitutional limits on political speech,
individuals and organizations can rely on the First Amendment to avoid
becoming contribution limits casualties in the political speech wars.
79. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 262.
80. Id. at 264-65 (quotations and citations omitted).
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